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Empire’s Present
Simon During
One way of bringing together Robert Young and Dipesh Chakrabarty’s timely essays is to recognize that Young wants to hang on to postcolonialism’s politics and analytic apparatus, 
while Chakrabarty wishes to move forward, not so much to leave post-
colonialism behind as to situate it alongside ways of thinking that are 
better able to deal with current circumstances, and with anthropogenic 
global warming (AGW) in particular. Young’s essay makes its case for 
postcolonialism’s continued vitality by pointing to situations where he 
believes it remains pertinent, that is, where the “politics of invisibility 
and of unreadability” come into play as they do when hegemonic groups 
fail to recognize the insecure, disempowered lives lived by the stateless, 
much of the Islamic world, and indigenous peoples. On the other side, 
Chakrabarty subtly sidelines postcolonialism, arguing (in his essay’s last 
section) that with AGW we have entered a new historical epoch that 
requires us to come to terms with a category over which postcolonialism 
has little command, namely “the inhuman-human.” 
My response to the difference between the two pieces is that Young’s 
essay underestimates the degree to which recent historical events have 
indeed diminished postcolonialism’s analytic and political force, while 
Chakrabarty’s overestimates the degree to which AGW marks a histori-
cal break in the same period. This is to imply that the essays connect 
around the irony by which the current global system of state capitalism 
has been compelled to confront its limits at the exact moment when, 
after assigning colonialism to history, it became the world’s only fully 
legitimated governmental system.
We can begin with Young’s arguments for postcolonialism’s continu-
ing force. For him, postcolonial theory’s usefulness will only cease 
when colonialism’s “transformative energies” no longer operate on the 
contemporary global order: “The only criterion that could determine 
whether ‘postcolonial theory’ has ended is whether . . . imperialism and 
colonialism in all their different forms have ceased to exist in the world, 
whether there is no longer domination by nondemocratic forces . . . or 
economic and resource exploitation enforced by military power, or a 
refusal to acknowledge the sovereignty of non-Western countries, and 
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whether peoples or cultures still suffer from the long-lingering afteref-
fects of imperial, colonial, and neocolonial rule, albeit in contemporary 
forms such as economic globalization” (20).
This way of thinking assumes that postcolonialism is a unified field. 
But that, after all, is questionable. From its beginnings, postcolonialism 
was constructed around internal divisions of which probably the most 
important was that between its “reconciliatory” and its “anticolonialist” 
wings. The first set out modes of analysis that undid the hard opposi-
tion between the colonized and the colonizer. To simplify somewhat, 
reconciliatory postcolonialism’s aim was to recover and analyze the his-
tory of the ambiguities, mimetic plays, hybridities, and loops through 
which the two sides—colonizer and colonized—prefigured, or arrived 
at, accommodation. On the other side—Young’s side—anticolonialist 
postcolonialism remained attached to the emancipatory drive of the 
postwar struggle against formal colonialism, which it treated just as an 
oppressive force. 
The obvious difficulty for anticolonialist postcolonialism, then, is that 
colonialism as a governmental structure is receding into history. As a 
consequence, it turns to something like the French distinction between 
la politique (formal politics) and le politique (the political considered as 
an autonomous field). For postcolonialism, la politique of colonialism has 
ended but le politique of colonialism continues to shape the global system.
Does it? At the very least, colonialism’s presence in current situations 
is often a matter of dispute. Take the case of NATO’s 1999 intervention 
in Kosovo. Was this, as many claimed, a case of colonialism après la lettre? 
(Régis Debray compared it to France’s war against the Algerians.) Or was 
it a humanitarian intervention on behalf of Kosovo’s Islamic people’s hu-
man rights? Similar arguments have occurred whenever Western powers, 
or international bodies dominated by Western powers, have intervened 
supposedly to liberate peoples from tyrannical rulers, as, for instance, in 
2011, when NATO enforced a no-fly zone in Libya. Likewise, postcolonial 
leaders like Robert Mugabe use the old rhetoric of anticolonialism to 
demonize their enemies who claim to be fighting for their freedom and 
rights. Whatever one’s position on these cases, the dispute over how to 
assess them can’t just appeal to the colonial paradigm, since what’s at 
stake is whether that paradigm is relevant in the first place. 
Similar difficulties appear in less contentious, if no less important, 
cases. For instance, Young argues that the rise over the past couple of 
decades in people who live and work in states in which they have no 
citizenship rights is to be understood as a fruit of colonialism. But, as 
he also recognizes, this precarious life is not just lived by those who 
are fleeing the peripheries for the center (to use the language of 
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world-system theory) but by those who move from one periphery to 
another. Indeed what organizes the formation of a global precariat (to 
use Pierre Bourdieu’s term) is not quite colonialism, but the worldwide 
system of democratic state capitalism in its contemporary form. And if 
the global system of democratic state capitalism is a historical product 
of colonialism, it is also a product of other processes and technologies 
independent of colonialism. In fact many of the postcolonized today find 
a comfortable berth in democratic state capitalism. It is worth pointing 
out, for instance, that the political party that represents New Zealand’s 
indigenous peoples—the Maori Party—is currently in power in coalition 
with a fiercely neoliberal party. Why has it joined the coalition? Partly 
best to protect the considerable capital sums that have accrued to iwi 
(tribes) by virtue of their successful appeal to the 1840 Waitangi treaty 
by which Maori seceded sovereignty to the British. How does anticolo-
nialist postcolonialism apply here?
The problem is more than casuistical because democratic capitalism is 
itself supported by many of the values that motivate Young’s critique of 
it, including democracy itself. He appeals for more democracy, believing 
that will weaken the politics of invisibility. But state-based representative 
democracy in particular is not an enemy of the political system in which 
the precariat, Islam’s social and intellectual complexity, and indigenous 
people’s interests may be neglected or made invisible. It is a key element 
of the system that enables such indifference, especially when voters 
demand immigration laws to be tightened and citizenship’s privileges 
to be protected. There’s no reason to believe that more direct forms of 
democracy would alter this. Nor, in this context, should we forget that 
the moment of Western Europe’s high imperialism was also the moment 
of its first mass democratization.
Young’s understanding of postcolonial theory’s current applicability 
further depends upon a moral judgment of colonialism. As I have said, 
he thinks of it just as a process of expropriation and domination. But 
again, arguably, that’s not exactly how it was. No doubt, and unforget-
tably, colonialism involved expropriation after expropriation, oppression 
after oppression, atrocity after atrocity. Nonetheless, even among those 
very aware of this, it has long been recognized that there is also a strong 
case for arguing that empire brought benefits to its subject peoples too. 
Marx himself came early to this cause. In his report on “The British Rule 
in India” for the New York Daily Tribune in June 1853, he noted that Brit-
ain was bringing about Asia’s first “social revolution” by obliterating old 
forms of Indian social organization. This revolution was a consequence 
“not so much [of] the brutal interference of the British tax-gatherer and 
the British soldier” as of “the working of English steam and English free 
trade.”1 At this point Marx ascends to an exhilarating flight of rhetoric:
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Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness those myriads of indus-
trious patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations disorganized and dissolved 
into their units, thrown into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing 
at the same time their ancient form of civilization and their hereditary means 
of subsistence, we must not forget that these idyllic village communities . . . had 
always . . . restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, 
making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional 
rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies. We must not forget 
the barbarian egotism, which, concentrating on some miserable patch of land, 
had quietly witnessed the ruin of empires, the perpetration of unspeakable cruel-
ties, the massacre of the population of large towns, with no other consideration 
bestowed upon them than on natural events. . . . We must not forget that these 
little communities were contaminated by distinctions of caste and by slavery, that 
they subjugated man to external circumstances instead of elevating man to be 
the sovereign of circumstances, that they transformed a self-developing social 
state into never changing natural destiny, and thus brought about a brutalizing 
worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in the fact that man, the sovereign 
of nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of Kanuman, the monkey, and 
Sabbala, the cow.2
It is difficult today to cite this passage without being offended by it. But 
let’s pause to examine it more closely. Marx contends that empire brings 
substantial benefits, even if consideration of these can only be mixed 
with a moral horror at imperialism’s brutality. His second point is that 
empire’s transformative power does not, however, depend on violence 
or state control but on political economy, that is, on imperialism be-
ing a vehicle of liberal capitalism. And his third thesis is that empire’s 
benefits are not so much material as intellectual and political. Empire 
ends social and moral passivity and ignorance; it opens the world to 
cosmopolitan exchanges; it secularizes so as to extend human control 
of nature and contingency. Downplaying Marx’s confident secular hu-
manism, we can say that what empire brings to populations restricted 
to local traditions and affiliations is the possibility to participate in the 
world at large, critically or not. Or to use another modern terminology: 
imperialism is an agent of development, where development is parsed 
as the extension of freedom or at least as “the removal of major sources 
of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities 
as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well 
as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states,” to cite Amartya Sen’s 
Development as Freedom, an important and (within limits) persuasive con-
temporary work, insufficiently acknowledged by postcolonialists, which 
implicitly continues Marx’s analysis.3 
One or other version of the “benefit of empire” thesis is now main-
stream. Manmohan Singh, India’s current Prime Minister, can, for in-
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stance, quite casually declare that the “idea of India as an inclusive and 
plural society” was inherited from the Raj. I make this point fully aware 
of the most recent and most public debate over the issue in the West—
that which followed the Nicolas Sarkozy’s UMP party’s 2006 passage of a 
law requiring French schools to teach colonialism’s positive values, a law 
which, however, was quickly repealed after widespread protest. But the 
insensitivity of extreme articulations of the benefit of empire argument 
like the UMP’s or, to take another example, like Niall Ferguson’s in his 
2006 BBC television program “Empire: How Britian Made the Modern 
World,” do not constitute sufficient grounds for dismissing the argument 
wholesale. It is better to turn to work like David Abernethy’s careful, 
sociologically grounded examination of empire’s various moral evalua-
tions in his recent book, The Dynamics of Global Dominance. Surveying a 
wide range of evidence, Abernethy concludes by arguing, like Marx, that 
colonialism was not the “sum-total of its worst case scenarios,” and that 
it nurtured new ideas that were “not only comforting and enlightening 
but empowering.”4
There are, however, important methodological difficulties with the 
benefit-of-empire argument. The value of the utilities that empire has 
indeed brought about (for example, better life expectancies, better ac-
cess to education and mobility across large sections of the population, 
etc.) cannot be measured against the violence, death, and suffering it 
inflicted on the way. Nor can its benefits be set against the effects of 
its fragmentation of cultures and identities. In both these cases, we are 
dealing not with equivalent, calculable quantities but with incommen-
surables. And of course the assessment of empire is necessarily made by 
appeal to values that adhere to our current global system, not to those 
of the cultures it has subsumed. That makes for a conceptual impasse.
Moral judgments for or against empire must also contend with the fact 
that imperialism/colonialism was not enacted by a single agent. It was 
driven forward by all kind of groups, sometimes including indigenous 
peoples themselves, and was continually interrupted by contestation 
of its policies and principles, both from within and without. Crucially, 
imperialism rarely proceeded through moments which allowed clear 
choices between itself and an alternative. Rather it moved forward fitfully, 
sometimes in naked expropriation and sovereign annexation; sometimes 
through acts of exchange and mutual benefit; sometimes blocked (and 
thus, paradoxically, secured) by central state intervention on behalf of 
indigenous peoples against unscrupulous settlers; sometimes in a collapse 
caused by disease; sometimes as a more or less unintended byproduct of 
scientific expeditions or Christian missions; sometimes by way of acts of 
careless primitive accumulation; sometimes, as I say, in manipulations of, 
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or violence against, one group of indigenous peoples by another. Cases 
of clear decisionism by states are relatively rare, although they include 
Commander Perry’s ultimatum to Japan to open its ports in 1853; and 
from outside the West, China’s Ming rulers forbidding Zheng He from 
further expeditions in the late 1420s. Nonstate players could be, of 
course, less circumspect. Take, from the anticolonialist side, Alexander 
Dalyrymple and Benjamin Franklin’s eighteenth-century proposal that 
the British trade with and supply the Maori with modern technology, 
but not colonize them, so as to preserve their lifeways. And from the 
colonialist side, Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s highly publicized and theo-
rized efforts to promote “systematic” colonization from the 1830s on. 
Tellingly though, none of Wakefield’s projects received state support (in 
some cases they were actively opposed by the Colonial Office), despite 
heavy lobbying. Europe may not have acquired its empire in a “fit of 
absent mindedness” as Jack Gallagher and Ronald Robinson famously 
remarked of British imperialism, but, for much of its history, it did not 
acquire it against any practical, or even expressible, alternative.
In sum: given colonialism’s limits and disjunctions, tribunalizing it 
quickly becomes posturing. Empire, we might say, solicits from us a 
moralism that it ultimately fails to satisfy. And that is partly because 
the retreat of colonialism does indeed open into a world order which 
colonialism has shaped and which it continues to haunt, but for which 
it no longer provides adequate terms of reference. In particular, as I 
have just argued, the moral critique of colonialism appeals to values that 
now shore up the current world system. More than that: to reform the 
system by implementing these values more evenly and effectively would 
set the seal on the benefit of empire argument. If our current system 
became as fair as we imagine it could be, colonialism would then be all 
the more retrospectively justified. So to move beyond the reformism that 
effectively legitimates empire requires more risky and innovative modes 
of thought. In lieu of revolutions against democratic state capitalism to 
which history shows no sign of tending, it requires us, I think, to reject 
the moral apparatus around which modern politics turn and, most 
incisively, it ends up by requiring us to reject that moral apparatus’s 
primary strut—the value of human life itself. Along one path this rejec-
tion might mean a return to a mode of nonhumanist theopolitics, one 
whose reference point might be ontology or Being in Heidegger’s sense. 
Or, of course, God. Alternatively, it might mean a turn to the inhuman. 
Which brings us to Chakrabarty’s essay. 
It begins by making a case for the need for modern political thought 
to hold together incommensurable ideals. Chakrabarty is not directly 
thinking of the incommensurabilities that I have been discussing around 
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which a judgment of empire, and hence postcolonialism, turn. He is 
thinking rather of those incompatibilities between the rights-bearing 
liberal individual, the full citizen of democratic state capitalism, and 
subjectivity conceived as a meeting place of differences and disjunctions, 
that is, as a subject who is an expression of “multiplicity in unity” or 
multorum in uno expressio as Leibniz long ago phrased it. This provides 
Chakrabarty with a basis for his much more radical suggestion that AGW 
means that we must “think of human agency over multiple and incom-
mensurable scales at once” (1), a formula in which, as we can observe, 
human agency nonetheless comes first.
Let us accept this recommendation: indeed in affirming the concept 
of human rights, Chakrabarty (following Homi Bhabha) helps us rec-
ognize that the Leibnizian, postmodernist/poststructuralist subjectivity 
paradigm is no longer adequate to the politics of endgame capitalism 
and precariousness. He has accepted that human rights have important 
ethical and political utility in the current system, as has become even 
clearer in Samuel Moyn’s recent historical account of their rise to promi-
nence since the 1970s.5 It may be, of course, that incommensurability 
is not, or is not always, the best way to think of relations between the 
rights-bearing individual and the subject-in-difference. They can also 
just oppose one another, after all. Or, more subtly, it might be more ac-
curate to think of rights (and the human “dignity” to which they appeal) 
as being affirmed in particular institutional settings—in relation to the 
state for instance—while a multiple, more distended subject is affirmed 
in another setting—in academic thought for instance. 
Putting all this aside, an important question still remains unsettled 
for me in Chakrabarty’s essay. What exactly is new in its presentation 
of relations between human beings and the environment? Haven’t we 
always had to think across human and inhuman scales? In this context, 
that AGW happens at a planetary scale seems to me less to the point 
than that man-made environmental transformations have always affected 
populations and shaped experience and history. Claims that “man is [or 
will become] the sovereign of nature,” as Marx put it in the citation 
above, have always been wishful.
The so-called “environmentalist thesis,” by which particular societies 
are considered to be effects of particular climates, dates back to the 
Hippocratic work Airs, Water, Places.6 Within this tradition, analyses which 
further understand climates themselves as effects of human activity have 
not been uncommon. Take R. G. Collingwood’s contention that history 
itself in its current sense—as the story of, and investigation into, past 
human actions—suddenly appeared in Greece in the fourth century 
BCE as a response to radical ecological instability. Earthquake and ero-
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sion (presumably partly caused by human activity) were then changing 
“the face of the land with a vehemence hardly to be seen elsewhere.”7 
So a metaphysics of permanence became difficult for Herodotus, who 
wrote the first description of social change on a purely human scale, 
including analyzing how Egyptian society was formed by its ecology. By 
this account, socially caused environmental degradation was a parent 
or agent of historicism itself.8
More specifically, thinking simultaneously on different scales, and of 
the dynamic and dialectical relations between different scales, has long 
been an important part of colonial historiography, as in works like Al-
fred W. Crosby’s Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 
900–1900, Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human 
Societies, and J. R. McNeill’s Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental 
History of the Twentieth-Century World. Let us focus on just one aspect of 
this literature. As Crosby’s book in particular points out, of the various 
relations between people and environment which drove colonialism on, 
few, if any, were more important than the development of grasslands 
across the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and Southern and East 
Africa. Grass-fed sheep and cattle, whose meat, by the late nineteenth 
century (the apex of empire), fed Western Europe across what James 
Belich has called a “protein bridge” that drew together an array of ecolo-
gies and technologies—grassland itself of course, but also refrigeration, 
mechanized slaughterhouses, and artificial fertilization—and which 
helped improve the health and confidence of Western, as well as some 
indigenous, peoples.9 Grassland became both a primary purpose and a 
reward of settler colonialism in the period between about 1880 and 1970. 
It changed landscapes, shaped ideologies, and reordered sociabilities in 
profound and uncontainable ways that were in large part ordered by the 
earth itself. And it has been understood by many of its progeny, which 
include Maori for instance, as a triumph of precisely human history. 
(This gives us reason to believe that, in centuries to come, at least some 
of AGW’s survivors too will celebrate the world that global warming has 
wrought, blind to ruins. The geological scale of the process will likely 
provide a further platform for progressivism.)
The truth of the grassland spiritual economy, as we might boldly 
say, appeared most clearly in art and literature. In New Zealand (to 
take an extreme case) the disjunctions that the settler agricultural 
ecology brought to bear on the settlers and their society appears with 
extraordinary force in Colin McCahon’s North Otago and Canterbury 
landscapes from the late forties on. In these pictures, which have learnt 
much from Cézanne, the geological geometries of depopulated and 
deforested landscapes, delivered over to grass and sheep bred to feed 
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distant populations, spell out the visual language of a cosmic but not 
sacred order. It’s a sparsely populated landscape whose scale is neither 
human nor geological, neither built nor natural, but which becomes a 
threshold into a perception of an “inhuman life” to use Eugene Thacker’s 
phrase.10 In this aesthetization of a particular ecological economy, what’s 
in question is not an incommensurablity between the human and the 
inhuman, but their merging, as if that were possible.
A similar, not-just-human sensibility nurtured in the colonial grasslands, 
is exposed in Janet Frame’s novel A State of Siege. There, after her mother’s 
death, a middle-aged art teacher, Malfred Signal moves from an isolated 
Central Otago village (settler country, sheep and cattle country) to an 
island outside of Auckland. It’s a brave experiment, aimed at finding and 
painting a “new vision” modeled on MacCahon’s. Malfred’s move is from 
one ecology to another: from the Otago grasslands and the communities 
and perceptions it brings into being, to a house near the bush (forest) 
with a view of the sea. She moves, that is, to a precolonial ecology, and 
one with Maori presence. But Malfred does not find her new vision 
in her new home. Instead she feels increasingly threatened. Exposing 
herself to her new environment while still possessed by her old one, her 
subjectivity erodes. It becomes a theater where remembered grassland, 
present forest, and sea clash against one another: an environmental al-
legory staged as imperiled experience. Actually that last phrase conceals 
a redundancy, since the words “imperiled” and “experience” derive from 
the same root, the Greek word peira for “trial” or “experiment,” as if to 
mark that experience is imperilment. And in the end a supernatural 
force (expressive of a precolonial past?) kills Malfred.
At this point we can return to Young’s anticolonialist politics and 
their appeal to the values by which democratic state capitalism improves 
and consolidates itself. One way out of that predicament, I suggested, 
might be to let go of the notion that the preservation and development 
of human life are fundamental moral ends. That too is McCahon and 
Frame’s message, which they come to by aesthetically responding to 
and articulating the profound ecological transformation caused by New 
Zealand settler colonialism. Theirs is not Chakrabarty’s message either, 
of course. He asks us to hold together the human and inhuman, the 
historical and the geological, human rights and the subject-in-difference. 
But I wonder whether he retains his faith in this still decent position (in 
John Rawls’s sense of “decent” in The Law of Peoples), because he remains 
interested in preserving human dignity against its latest threat, and so 
passes too quickly over the possibility that AGW, for all its planetary 
scale, is just another moment in the long history in which the human 
effort to survive and control its environment has led to the species’ more 
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insistent determination by its environment. To see AGW as continuous 
with the past also allows one to regard it as just another event in the 
ceaseless train of events in which experience is fused with imperilment. 
And ultimately (I’d say in a somewhat Pascalian spirit) to concentrate 
on that fusion is to stay most true to the species’ place in the world. The 
primacy of imperilment is at risk when we begin to take self-ascribed, 
politically and legally useful dignities and rights as real, or, to say this 
more carefully, as grounded in a philosophical anthropology.
University of Queensland
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